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- 立花隆 「サル学の現在」(平凡社, 1991)

concerns of feminism and US literature, but by way of conclusion I would like to enumerate some other connections to be entertained as possibilities. Admittedly, not many American novels or short stories spring to mind that have apes as major protagonists. However, a member of the Kyushu American Literature Society, Ogi Fusami, has recently written insightful papers on Poe's short stories which show orangutans and costumed apes instantiating an inarticulate Foucauldian Other. On a broader level, numerous works of US literature are situated at the nexus of nature and science which Haraway establishes: Franklin, Jefferson, Thoreau, Twain, Steinbeck, Vonnegut, Kesey, and Pynchon might be taken as a chronological line of the masculinist canon to compare in this regard. Likewise, the themes of the Frontier and the seductive Virgin Land might be significantly resituated in terms of gender and colonialization. It should be interesting to look again at Cooper's and Longfellow's Indians to see how they have changed. Haraway's clarification of multiple coding systems such as gender, race, and nature should also be useful in coming to terms with a wide range of works, such as early slave narratives or 20th century fiction by Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, Zora Neale Hurston, and others.

Further interconnections can certainly be drawn to those topics, but as a final observation I will simply stress the value of Haraway's methodology for researchers in the speciality we casually call "American literature," particularly her semiotic analysis which concerns itself not just with "literature"—scientific or otherwise—but with writing in all its broad spectrum of realizations. I believe that if we accept the consequences of this methodological shift, then it must be recognized that feminism is not a handy little tool, one among others, to be picked up occasionally. Quite the contrary, American literature as an academic specialty is properly and constantly subject to feminism, which has convincingly shown the pervasiveness of gendered semiosis.

Suggested Reading

Haraway, Donna. *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the*

Haraway's drama metaphor, for instance, posits Kabuki or Noh as potential analogues in one casual sentence, as if there were few meaningful differences in the choice. The Japanese word "kyokan" (共感) discussed at length by Haraway is the common vocabulary item usually translated as "sympathy," and (as she acknowledges) Kawai's use of the term may be "eccentric." In developing her analysis of the Japanese narrative field, Haraway relied on several technical articles on primatology, Doi Takeo's *The Anatomy of Self*, Ian Buruma's *Behind the Mask*, and an Oxford University doctoral dissertation by Pamela Asquith; though this pot pourri generates interpretive possibilities, there remains a need for much more extensive and careful examination of the evidence in this discursive force field. At any rate, Haraway does not succumb to the temptations of glorifying the East. She says flat out that Japanese primate studies are more "male-dominated" than those in western nations (246), and she does not mince words when summarizing the masculinism permeating Japanese primatology despite its greatly contrasting conceptualization:

My concluding moral is simple: Holism, appreciation of intuitive method, presence of "matriarchal" myth systems and histories of women's cultural innovation, cultivation of emotional and cognitive connection between humans and animals, absence of dualist splits in objects of knowledge, qualitative method subtly integrated with rigorous and longterm quantification, extensive attention to the female social organization as the infrastructure grounding more visible male activities, and lack of culturally reinforced fear of loss of personal boundaries in loving scientific attention to the world are all perfectly compatible with masculinism in epistemology and male dominance in politics. The lessons of Japanese primatology for current analyses in western feminist philosophical and social studies of science are clear on these points. (256)

Surveying the cultural and social constraints at work on Japanese literary critics might provide other sorts of equally intriguing results.

In my overview of *Primate Visions* I have from time to time made suggestions about how this big monkey book can be connected to the

in need of recontextualization, for instance, and we may find that Columbus was not so badly mistaken when he thought the New World was Asian. By attribution exotic, beautiful, illogical, elusive, lethargic, changeable, alluring, intuitive, fertile, indecipherable, alien, both Woman and Orient share a marginalized position in a narrative field which has yet to be surveyed and mapped fully.

An interesting test case for exploring the imagined boundaries between East and West would be to examine the discursive practices employed by Asian primatologists, and in fact Haraway adopts precisely this procedure in two sections of her book: "The Mirror and the Mask: the Drama of Japanese Primates" and "Supplies of Sacred Monkeys: Primatologists in India." Not just because this is the Year of the Monkey, primate-related works in Japan seem to be enjoying a boom. More than 40 years ago, Kyushu was the site of the first postwar primate field studies in the world (Haraway 123), and since 1962 the work of Japanese pioneer primatologists has become widely known in global scientific circles. Haraway singles out the studies of Imanishi Kinji and Kawai Masao for investigation. Numerous cultural and social differences immediately emerge to show that scientific discourse, like its literary counterparts, is highly constrained in the stories it can tell. For instance, Haraway argues that Japanese scientists did not start with the concept of the "autonomous individual" or with the "sacred mother-infant primal One" (175). Operating in "non-western narrative fields" (175), Japanese researchers were not bound to retell "the story of Paradise Lost" (244). Rather, the macaques and other primates studied "might be viewed as actors in a Kabuki drama or a Noh drama" (245), and nature for these scientists was more likely to be "an aesthetic value and understood to require careful tending, arrangement, and rearrangement" (248). Furthermore, Kawai and perhaps other Japanese scientists rely on the Japanese idea of "kyokan" or "empathetic method" (252).

The attempt by Haraway to invert the east/west dichotomy immediately raises provocative and interesting issues, but for those of us on this side of the Pacific the initial speculations may seem occasionally dubious.

elaboration of gender from the resource of sex, the emergence of mind by the activation of body. To effect these transformative operations, simian “orientalist” discourse must first construct the terms: animals, nature, body, primitive, female. (Haraway 11)

Focusing on the “interacting dualisms [of] *sex/gender* and *nature/culture*,” Haraway suggests that through their “guiding logic” “western primatology is simian orientalism.” “If orientalism concerns the western imagination of the city,” she says, “primatology displays the western imagination of the origin of socielity itself, especially in the densely meaning-laden icon of ‘the family’” (Haraway 10). Not content to deal with this only on a theoretical level, Haraway documents the orientalization of women, men, and primates around the world, particularly in India and Africa. Besides showing how western knowledge of nature is colonized, warped in the lens of orientalism, she also calls for a more responsible perspective, historically and socially situated (Haraway 274).

After surveying numerous popular and scientific texts Haraway concludes that

... in all these stories humans from scientific cultures are placed in “nature” in gestures that absolve the reader and viewer of unspoken transgressions, that relieve anxieties of separation and solitary isolation on a threatened planet and for a culture threatened by the consequences of its own history. But the films and articles rigorously exclude the contextualizing politics of decolonization and exploitation of the emergent Third World, obligatory and normative heterosexuality, masculine dominance of a progressively warbased scientific enterprise in industrial civilization, and the racial symbolic and institutional organization of scientific research. Instead, the dramas of communication, origins, extinction, and reproduction are played out in a nature that seems innocent of history. If history is what hurts, nature is what heals. (Haraway 156)

For specialists in the field of American literatures, itself a curious blend of colonized and colonizing discourses, these observations may well create some resonance; the American Adam and the myth of the frontier may be

intended Euro-Asian audience see Kong as a tragic hero too. Kong crossed the boundaries of his species in a tragic overreach, but his sexuality was admirable. Kong sought consummation in the protective possession of his innocent female prize, and thereby established the essential—if masked by the form of the beast—humanity; he could be father of a new and better race. But his bestial over-reach also had the unmistakable tone of racial crossing; for the white inflamed imagination he was the icon of the captive black man's love for the white woman. Beast and “primitive,” Kong was lynched.

(Haraway 161)

More recent popular entertainment films such as *Project X* (1987) and *The Gods Must Be Crazy* (1984) also receive analogous readings using the triple code, making clear that we cannot merely dismiss such disturbing collateral messages as relics of Depression-era racism and sexism. Throughout all sectors of popular culture such readings can be realized since, Haraway argues, they necessarily operate within “narrative fields” or “social-epistemological force fields” (116). The discursive laws at work in these fields are at work in canonized literature as well.

Among the extensive variety of analyses offered by Haraway, there is one of particular relevance to all of us at work in Asia on the national literature of the USA: her examination of the “mystifications of the ‘Oriental,’” (247) a running motif of discourse which in its primatological variant she calls “Simian Orientalism.” Quite emphatically attempting to “disrupt the ideological stance that the West is One” (116), Haraway extends the influential work begun by Edward Said's 1978 study, *Orientalism*, in which the capitalized Orient is imaginatively marginalized, recreated as an exotic Other whose “representations are complex mirrors for western selves in specific historical moments” (Haraway 10).

Simian Orientalism means that western primatology has been about the construction of the self from the raw material of the other, the appropriation of nature in the production of culture, the ripening of the human from the soil of the animal, the clarity of white from the obscurity of color, the issue of man from the body of woman, the

(Olympus, I believe). Koko even kept a pet, a kitten, which she requested linguistically from her friend, colleague, and scientist, Penny Patterson. Haraway has an interesting comment on the particular kind of “humanization” Koko undergoes.

Koko seems to be placed in culture, the realm of the human, by her keeping a pet, and above all by naming him. The lesson is that she is like “humans.” But “humans” do not keep pets; members of particular societies do. Koko is given the attributes of the camera, the mirror, and the book—all to endow her with the “human” property of self-consciousness. But a “self” is a complex historical construction that emerged in the forms characterizing Koko during the modern development of class, gender, and race (Lowe 1982). Koko’s self seems to have been crafted in the political theory and political economy, not to mention the consumer culture, of the modern west. The gorilla has been brought into culture without bringing her, and her kind, into history.... The organizing story axis of the duality, nature-culture, forbids an account of historical meditation. (Haraway 146)

Clearly, Koko is not exhibiting universal human traits, but rather late 20th century bourgeois ideals decontextualized to make them appear universal. Many apes have been appropriated as commentaries on human social activity, such as Jiro, who so expertly impersonates the president of the United States, but Koko’s position is distinctive in that it is not operative in a comic mode and yet it powerfully affects both the popular imagination and the scientific.

Koko, Jane and Harry are all roles in semiotic play which correspond to actually living beings, but Haraway also considers a number of figures completely encapsulated in fictive or mythic worlds. King Kong, hero of the 1933 film bearing his name, is surely the biggest name in the “primate order,” and Haraway here again shows a mastery of textual dissection, teasing out meanings most viewers will have overlooked. Reading with the “triple code of gender, science, and race,” Haraway argues that “the noble love and virile sexuality of Kong”

turned to the true worship of the white woman, demanded that the

Jane Goodall is, of course, the foremost representative of a well-known group of women who as primatologists have been made prominent by the mass media in recent decades, and Haraway is meticulous in examining the implications of her narrative manipulation. In several films and articles published by the National Geographic Society, Goodall's work is narrativized in various ways for the popular imagination. In the early film *Miss Goodall and the Wild Chimpanzees* (1965), for instance, she is "Jane," not the consort of Tarzan but a protagonist surrounded by signs "constantly" "marking her status as a girl, even while she is engaged on a quest that will change the definition of man" (180). This is in striking contrast to the many films and articles presenting women more as surrogate mothers than as primatologists. Concerning genre, Haraway suggests provocatively and persuasively that the Goodall film "is a first contact narrative, recognizable within science fiction conventions" (179). Furthermore, Haraway shows that the myth of the solitary young white woman contacting the alien forest relatives is contradicted by numbers: "People from the community called 'scientists' considerably outnumbered chimpanzees ... during the most intense years of research activity" (170). In the earlier films and articles black Africans are invisible, made sub-human links to the chimpanzees, leaving Goodall alone as a "virgin-priestess." The narratives change over the two turbulent decades so that by 1984, the year of *Among the Wild Chimpanzees*, viewers are forced to contend with war, infanticide, and cannibalism among the chimps rather than complacently chuckling over "comic competition" for bananas. Haraway shows too how intrusive the Society's editorial policy is, even to the point of retouching photographs to make it appear wild apes are toilet-trained.

The exemplary case studies of Goodall's and Harlow's narrativizations which I have placed in juxtaposition do not begin to suggest the variety of texts treated by Haraway. Not just men and women scientists but the primates themselves are actants in these stories. For instance, there is the gorilla Koko, presented in films, photos, and print as a being who can communicate using human (sign) language and who enjoys using a camera

Though Harlow is probably the most famous of the earlier researchers using primates, Haraway investigates many others, including Sherwood Washburn, Robert Yerkes, C. R. Carpenter, and Stuart Altmann, in each case attempting to identify operative discursive practices within a social and cultural situation. The so-called “universals” being presented by scientists are shown to be narrative projections functioning under identifiable constraints. Using what she calls “the tools of narrative history,” Haraway comments as follows on the tales told by the postwar scientific solons in the US.

Allegorical narratives seem to order themselves easily in analogous series: the humanizing way of life posited for the ever older fossils, destined for only two hominid genera, *Australopithecus* and *Homo*; the human way of life of universal man insisted upon in the documents drawn up by the victors of a world war; the primate way of life of monkeys trying to make a living on land constructed as nature in game park established by colonial practice at the eve of decolonization; and the scientific way of life enacted in a research program in the post-World War II United States science establishment. All these can be reconstructed as elements of a unifying narrative about origins and ends, that turns out to be about the fruitful and always densely particular ambiguity of fiction and fact in story-laden sciences about what it meant to be human. What it means to be universal man and to be human generically turns out to look very much like what it meant to be western scientific men, especially in the United States, in the 1950s. (Haraway 186)

It should not be assumed that Haraway does anything so naive as attack male scientists’ biased story-telling while reserving praise for the few female researchers who magically transcended their stations to tell the truth. Quite the contrary, Haraway is quite explicit in stating women “shared the other researchers’ many-layered relationships to gender, decolonization, class, race, and other large historical constructions” (Haraway 129), and Haraway is much involved with the narrative structuring of women’s scientific texts as well.

The images, words, and people issuing from the primate laboratories at the University of Wisconsin in Madison were key actors in midtwentieth-century US sociotechnical orders. (Haraway 231)

Despite the fact that he was writing the science of nature, Harlow is shown by Haraway to have been operating within the narrative conventions of the burlesque, the travel story, and the autobiographical myth of a second birth. Furthermore, sadism is shown as a structuring motif, though Haraway does not accuse Harlow of exceptional cruelty.

Reinforcing the heroic masculinist narrative of self-birthing is the forceps of sadism. It is important to stress that the sadism does not lie, at least not originally, in the fact of causing repeated pain to animals in the course of experiments. Rather, the sadism is the organizer of the narrative plot and part of the material apparatus for the cultural production of meanings; sadism is about meanings produced by particular structures of vision, not about pain. In fact, sadism is about pleasure in vision; it is an erotic visual discipline for self-objectification....

Sadism is a shadow twin to modern humanism, a fact well understood by de Sade and Foucault. Harlow's lab was about the fulfillment of primate potential, not about the agony of research animals.... Indeed, Harlow's experimental subjects were probably better off than the overwhelming number of laboratory primates in the same period, more a dismal commentary on lab culture than a tribute to the Wisconsin practices. Sadism is about the structure of scientific vision, in which the body becomes a rhetoric, a persuasive language-linked social practice. The final cause, or telos, of that practice is the production of the unmarked abstract universal, man.

(Haraway 233)

The misogyny apparent in Harlow's sexist "humor" is also shown as a "productive ... discourse practice," though it also shows incidentally how feminists have forced changes in politeness conventions over the last two decades. It seems likely that Harlow will, despite his own wishes, go down in history as "the father of the cloth mother" (Haraway 231).

itself depend of the dualism between active and passive, culture and nature, human and animal, social and natural...

Stories are always a complex production with many tellers and hearers, not all of them visible or audible. Story-telling is a serious concept, but one happily without the power to claim unique or closed readings. Primatology seems to be a science composed of stories, and the purpose of this book is to enter into contestations for their construction. (Haraway 8)

Haraway even goes so far as to ask whether a “scientific analysis could be postmodernist” (309). Whatever answers may derive for that query, the textuality and the intertextuality of “story-laden” scientific practice are thoroughly documented by Haraway in dozens of thoughtprovoking cases.

The work of one well-known scientist, Harry Harlow, which appeared in almost every introductory psychology textbook in the 60s and 70s, is examined in detail in Haraway’s Chapter 9, “Metaphors into Hardware: Harry Harlow and the Technology of Love.” Harlow studied the psychology of child development by replacing the mothers of infant rhesus monkeys with various types of so-called “surrogate mothers,” some warm and comparatively cuddly, others designed to throw the infant off or repel it with spikes or compressed air blasts. These procedures, not too surprisingly, produced psychopathologies that could be analysed for the edification of the National Institute of Mental Health and the rest of the scientific community. In representing Harlow’s research, Haraway emphasizes the importance of his role as story-teller.

Harry F. Harlow (1905-1981) was a master narrator. He could design and build experimental apparatus and model the bodies and minds of monkeys to tell the major stories of his culture and his historical moment. One story is about the prolific nature of science, about the reproduction of authorship in the virile children of the mind, about the rabbit-like fecundity and virus-like repetitiveness of the curious modern object called scientific research. And like viruses and sadists, Harlow’s repetitiveness was innovative and visionary.

women scientists to be adequate in rectifying the situation. Rather, women and men in the lab and in the field become the targets for deconstructive sorties, their so-called “objective” results revealed to be socially constrained narratives operating according to identifiable fictive conventions. Women doing good scientific work will not be able to find the one true objectivity any more than men can. But the stories that science tells can be profitably contested. Haraway puts it this way:

One story is not as good as another. This book is about what enables and what constrains a particular kind of story-telling practice—scientific narrative in a field of extreme boundary disputes, among many differently situated biologists, comparative anatomists, and molecular biologists. The boundary disputes written into the bodies of primates—fossil and living, human and nonhuman—involve the major themes of modern history, from decolonization to nuclear war to feminism.... Attention to narrative is not instead of attention to science, but is emphasized in order to understand a particular kind of scientific practice that remains intrinsically story-laden—as a condition of doing good science. (Haraway 331)

Narrativization is found to be constantly at work in the natural sciences, just as it is in the realms of more emphatically aestheticized literature. Haraway’s stated goal is telling the history of science in a new way, a better way that should have repercussions for the telling of literary history as well.

I am looking for a way of telling a story of the production of a branch of the life sciences, a branch which includes human beings centrally, that listens very carefully to the stories themselves. My story must listen to the practices of interpretation of the primate order in which the primates themselves—monkeys, apes, and people—all have some kind of “authorship.” I would suggest that the concept of constrained and contested story-telling allows an appreciation of the social construction of science, while still guiding the hearer to a search for the other animals who are active participants in primatology. I want to find a concept for telling a history of science that does not

(Ruthven 39-40)

Suffice it to say that invidious nature has been clearly tagged in a mutually enhancing cooperative effort by feminist theory and semiotics. The work of Donna Haraway can best be seen as departing from this base of operations to survey in extraordinary depth and detail the variety of texts inscribing nature.

Haraway was trained as a scientist, a biologist, and her books and essays for the most part have dealt with scientific writing in the modern and postmodern worlds, a stance that some feminists such as Elaine Showalter have been reluctant to accept.

The new sciences of the text based on linguistics, computers, genetic structuralism, deconstructionism, neoformalism and deformatism, affective stylistics, and psychoaesthetics, have offered literary critics the opportunity to demonstrate that the work they do is as manly and aggressive as nuclear physics—not intuitive, expressive, and feminine, but strenuous, rigorous, impersonal, and virile....

The experience of women can easily disappear, become mute, invalid, and invisible, lost in the diagrams of the structuralist or the class conflict of the Marxists. Experience is not emotion; we must protest now as in the nineteenth century against the equation of the feminine with the irrational. But we must also recognize that the questions we most need to ask go beyond those that science can answer.

(Showalter 140; 141)

Though fully aware that science has marginalized women, sanitized hard aggression, and glorified an unachievable objectivity, Haraway also sees the possibility of “good science” being done by women. Neither Showalter nor Haraway would want to reanimate the stereotype of feminine intuition or illogicality, of course.

In fact, the science of primatology has had an unusually high number of women participating in the revolutionary reappraisal of human origins which has taken place over the last thirty years or so, and their studies constitute a major topic of consideration in *Primate Visions*. But Haraway's approach is far too sophisticated to assume a mere catalogue of

'natural' inferiority but by their classification as intrinsically inferior by a male-dominated culture they cannot avoid living in. The rival forces which compete discursively for the possession of 'woman'... [are] labelled Nature and Culture, which Claude Lévi-Strauss has made the most famous binary opposition in structuralist thought. Nature is the way things are, and Culture what we make them out to be.

'Custom", Bathsua Makin noted in 1673, 'hath a mighty influence: it hath the force of Nature itself.' This is because growing up we internalise cultural conventions so well that they become 'second nature' to us, and therefore even to conceive of breaking with them seems 'unnatural'. For it is characteristic of Culture to be passed off as Nature.... Women are not inferior by Nature but inferiorised by Culture: they are acculturated into inferiority. (Ruthven 44- 5)

The passing reference here to Lévi-Strauss's structuralism in addition provides a hint of how effective countermeasures might be fabricated. Ruthven suggests that sociolinguistics and semiotics are particularly applicable to the sorts of problems feminists critics must face.

There is obviously much to interest feminists in a project like linguistics, which determined from the outset to be 'descriptive' in contradistinction to the 'prescriptive' grammars it sought to replace.... If value does not inhere in texts but is conferred upon them, the distinction between 'literature' and 'non-literature' is without foundation: there is merely 'writing' (*écriture*), some of which gets called 'literature' by people whose interests it satisfies. This is useful to know when confronted by the jibe that most women are not capable of creating literature, and that the few who are have been acknowledged already. A shift in emphasis from 'literature' to *écriture* permits attention to be given to what earlier critics consider marginal or subliterate forms, such as letters and journals, and to just about any piece of discursive prose which has something to say about women.... To speak of 'women's writing' enables feminists to bypass problems of value raised in androcentric criticism by the term 'women's literature'.

promising refusal of any notion of a female nature or essence is succinctly summed up in her famous statement 'One is not born a woman; one becomes one'. (Moi 92)

K.K. Ruthven's *Feminist Literary Studies: An Introduction* also provides an admirably clear statement of the appropriate strategy for dealing with the "natural essence" foisted upon women.

If you want to change the way people think about women in a world dominated by men, you must first discourage the habit of defining 'woman' as an essence whose 'nature' is determined biologically, and whose sole destiny is to reproduce the human species. For that is precisely the ideology—'anatomy is destiny'—which makes a woman feel it is somehow 'unnatural' of her to place any activity above her reproductive role. It also ensures that men encounter only a little competition at work from a few female 'freaks' and none at all from the majority of 'real' women, who stay at home to bring up families in their 'proper' sphere. In order to change the situation, you have to conceive of 'woman' not as an essence which precedes the social organization of life, but as a category or construct produced by a society and mediated in the discourses which it circulates about itself. It is not a question of deciding what a woman 'is' by nature, but of examining what she is assumed to be in the society or culture in which she lives, how those assumptions came about, and whose interests they serve. For seeing that different societies 'construct' women in different ways, it is clear that 'woman'—far from being an immutable essence—is in fact a culturally variable construct, which each society produces for particular reasons. (Ruthven 36)

If nothing else, the large number of scare quotes in this passage shows how language has been thoroughly appropriated for patriarchal objectives, how complicated it can become to discuss even the most elementary points.

Ruthven is also particularly effective in presenting the fundamentals of how the nature/culture dichotomy operates to women's detriment.

The subjection of women, therefore, is brought about not by their

Formulating such an enormous argument within the limits of a short essay might well strain my abilities, however, so I will instead narrow my focus for the most part to a consideration of a single volume by a single contemporary analyst. Specifically, I will offer a free-ranging overview of the 1989 publication, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*, by Donna Haraway, a professor working in Women's Studies and the History of Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz. In fact, this single study by Haraway is itself nearly 500 pages of reasoned speculation on a fascinating and improbable range of texts: teddy bears, Tarzan, National Geographic Society TV specials, King Kong, UNESCO documents, comic books, science fiction, popular movies, Kabuki, academic grant proposals, greeting cards, informal snapshots, coloring books, and advertising artwork are just some of the intertextual sites which she explores. Occasionally, a novel or a poem gets mentioned. Probably, even to provide selective coverage of this one book will be taxing, but I hope the attempt will be worthwhile in introducing an innovative and provocative mind at work on the social semiotics of gender and text.

Haraway is not alone in examining how nature in its various guises has been enlisted to put women in their place, of course. Numerous contemporary critics have examined the issue, often starting with an echo of Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. Toril Moi, for instance, in her concise handbook *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory*, has this to say:

Beauvoir's main thesis in this epochal work is simple: throughout history, women have been reduced to objects for men.... Or, in more existential terms: patriarchal ideology presents woman as immanence, man as transcendence.

Beauvoir shows how these fundamental assumptions dominate all aspects of social, political, and cultural life and, equally important, how women themselves internalize this objectified vision.... The fact that women often enact the roles patriarchy has prescribed for them does not prove that the patriarchal analysis is right: Beauvoir's uncom-

The Nature of Women's Inferiority: An Introduction to the Feminist Semiotics of Donna Haraway

Scott Pugh

The natural inferiority of women is well established as a social, political, and cultural premise and has been as long as we care to look back into the past. We do not have to look very far, of course. Only within the lifetimes of many of us have Japanese women been granted the right to vote, and only within the lifetimes of a few people still living has that same right been instituted for women in the United States. Adding just two lifetimes together places us back in an age when some women and men were legally bought and sold in the "land of the free." We can and do pride ourselves on the fact that these injustices lie in the unenlightened past.

The semiotic moves by which we relegate recognized evils to a transcended domain called History are highly interesting, but the concern of my remarks here will be instead that even more elusive signifier, Nature, a token which has, curiously, been used to justify and promote such causes as racism, genocide, infanticide, destruction of the ecosystem, the subjugation of women, and other, worthier endeavors. A structural and functional analysis of the ways nature is called into service will provide us with critical tools indispensable for a better understanding of feminist theory and American literature. The stress in my title, then, will be on the word "Nature," and I hope to show that if scholars of American literature do not adopt feminist approaches to map the insinuations of nature, they will continue to be mastered by their subject matter.